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An Appellate Mechanism for Review of
Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State
Disputes: Prospects and Challenges
David A. Gantz
ABSTRACT

At a time when complaints and decisions in investor-state
arbitrationare proliferatingas never before, concerns are being
raised by the U.S. Congress,NGOs and some foreign governments
over the lack of consistency (orserious errors)among the decisions
that emanate from the largely ad hoc arbitralpanels that are
created under the provisions of bilateral investment treaties and
the investment provisions of free trade agreements, such as
NAFTA, Chapter 11. As a result, it is suggested that an appellate
mechanism, perhaps patterned after the generally successful
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, be created,
possibly under the auspices of the World Bank's International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. The United
States-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement is likely to be the locus of the first serious negotiation
aimed at creating such a body, given that such negotiations are
mandated under that FTA's provisions. The chances of success,
however, particularlyin the near term, may well be elusive, in view
of the extensive legal and practicalchallenges to creating a wellfunctioning mechanism, and the divergent constituencies that
would have to be satisfied.
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During the past few years there has been increasing discussion of a
new "appellate body," or to avoid confusion with the World Trade
Organization (WTO), an "appellate mechanism," for reviewing arbitral
decisions in investor-state disputes.1 While the current interest in the
concept appears to have originated in the debate leading up to the
United States' Trade Promotion Authority legislation of 2002, Professor
Thomas Walde indicates that the idea dates back at least to 1991.2 The
most recent concrete proposal, subsequently recanted and now in limbo,
was offered in an October 2004 International Centre for Settlement of
3
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Secretariat document.

1.
See William H. Knull III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farmon International
Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an Appeal Option, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 531 (2000)
(suggesting that internal appeals processes for investment disputes have a role for highstakes and complex arbitrations); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisisin Investment
Treaty Arbitration:PrivatizingPublicInternationalLaw Through InconsistentDecisions,
73 FORDHAM L.R. 1521 (2005) (arguing that the expanding volume of investor-state
arbitral decisions call for, among other things, an appellate court to discourage
inconsistent decisions).
2.
Email from Thomas Walde to OGEMID (Nov. 7, 2004, 16:25) (on file with
Author) (giving credit for the idea to Sir Eli Lauterpacht).
3.
ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper, PossibleImprovement of the Framework
for ICSIDArbitration, Oct. 22, 2004, Part VI [hereinafter ICSID Discussion Paper]. The
principal drafter of that paper, Antonio R. Parra, explained at a June 2005 ICSID
conference that the proposal for an ICSID-based investment dispute appellate mechanism
had been premature, and the subsequent version of the discussion paper makes no
mention of that proposal. See News Release, ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the
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The appellate mechanism issue, however, is no longer simply an
academic or theoretical one. Once the United States-Central AmericanDominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 4 enters into
force, presumably some time in 2006 for most of the signatories, 5 an
annex to CAFTA-DR requires the parties to establish a negotiating
group for an "appellate body or similar mechanism" within three months
and to prepare a suitable amendment to CAFTA-DR within a year
thereafter. 6 It is thus reasonably possible that some sort of more
concrete proposal for an appellate mechanism will evolve in the CAFTADR context. If the process outlined in CAFTA-DR succeeds, there will be
renewed pressure to agree on a similar mechanism on the parties to the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 7 (United States,
Canada, Mexico) and signatories to other recent U.S. bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) with
investment provisions.
Actual implementation of an investment appellate mechanism for
CAFTA-DR, NAFTA, or other FTAs or BITs is, of course, another matter
entirely. Such a process, which requires an amendment to each of the
agreements by each party through its constitutional processes, could
take years to complete, or may never reach fruition. The controversial
nature of the appellate mechanism and the political sensitivity, after
CAFTA-DR, of submitting any trade agreement or amendment thereto to
the U.S. Congress or other legislatures, make prompt creation of an
appellate mechanism highly problematic, even assuming that the

ICSID
Rules
and
Regulations
(May
12,
2005),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/sug-changes.htm [hereinafter ICSID Suggested Changes].
4.
United States-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement
(United States, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua), Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral]
CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/Section_Index.html
(last visited Aug. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
5.
While it had been hoped that CAFTA-DR would enter into force January 1,
2006, for all seven members (United States, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), this did not occur. The U.S. Trade
Representative's Office announced on December 30, 2005, that CAFTA-DR would be
implemented on a "rolling basis," and that the United States "will continue to work
intensively with CAFTA-DR partners to bring them on board as quickly as possible."
(USTR also noted that all of the parties except Costa Rica, which has not yet ratified the
FTA, were working together to complete the process as soon as possible.) USTR Press

Release, Statement of Spokesman Stephen Norton RegardingCAFTA-DR Implementation,
Dec. 30, 2005, available at http://www.ustr.org. As of April 1, 2006, the Agreement had
entered into force for El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States.
6.
CAFTA-DR, supranote 4, Annex 10-F. It is unclear from the text whether the
Annex is triggered before the Agreement enters into force for all of the seven parties.
Under the circumstances, the outset of formal negotiations should probably be deferred
until at least most of the seven have become parties.
7.
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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CAFTA-DR negotiating group actually produces a "draft amendment" in
a timely manner.
This Article discusses how the investment appellate mechanism
concept originated; reviews the current "appeal" process for investorstate arbitral decisions, with particular attention to the three NAFTA
Chapter 11 arbitral decisions that have been reviewed to date; sets forth
the rationale supporting an appellate mechanism; and considers the key
legal issues, standard of review, and other major political, procedural,
and legal hurdles. The Article concludes with a few comments and
recommendations.

I. THE GENESIS OF THE APPELLATE MECHANISM CONCEPT

The current impetus in the United States for an investment
appellate mechanism in investor-state dispute arbitration comes
primarily from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), several
domestic government agencies (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency
and Department of Justice), and Congressional concerns regarding
NAFTA Chapter 11. Chapter 11 contemplates the likelihood of disputes
between a foreign investor or service provider and the host government
or an agency.8 Under Chapter 11, foreign investors may seek arbitration
under Chapter 11 of any of the rights and obligations guaranteed in
Section A: most favored nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment,
freedom from export or local content performance requirements, the
right to make most financial transfers, and restrictions against
expropriation, whether direct or indirect. 9 Among the concerns that
NGO and Congressional critics have raised is the claim that "normal"
regulatory actions, including but not limited to those in the
environmental or health fields, would constitute compensable takings.
These issues were raised, inter alia, in Methanex Corp. v. United States1 °
11
and Sun Belt Water v. Canada.

8.
See generally NAFTA, supra note 7, ch. 11.
9.
NAFTA, supra note 7, arts. 1103, 1105, 1106, 1109; 1110. Procedures for
international arbitration between NAFTA nationals and the NAFTA governments are
contained in Section B.
10.
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Partial Award, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Aug. 7,
2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf [hereinafter
Methanex, Partial Award].
See Pleadings, Orders and other documents,
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes us 6.htm (currently ending with the hearing
transcripts dated June 2004).
11.
Sun Belt Water, Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Claim and Demand for Arbitration,
(NAFTA Arb. Trib. Oct. 12, 1999), http://naftaclaims.com. The action, claiming that
Canada had discriminated against the firm in denying it the right to export water from
Canada, was never pursued.
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With regard to "regulatory" takings, the focus has been on
Methanex. The Canadian firm Methanex challenged the action of the
State of California in banning MTBE, a gasoline additive, because of the
12
perceived risks of MTBE pollution of the underground water supply.
Methanex manufactured methanol, the principal ingredient in MTBE,
and argued that the measures taken by California constituted a
"substantial interference and taking of Methanex US' business and
Methanex's investment in Methanex US. These measures were
characterized
both directly
and indirectly
tantamount
to
expropriation." 13 The original tribunal did not reach the question of
whether California's action constituted a compensable taking under
Article 1110; it dismissed the original complaint on grounds that the
connection between the California MTBE ban and Methanex's operations
was not "legally significant" enough to satisfy the "relating to" language
in NAFTA Article 1101.14 All claims against the United States
contained in a revised claim, both jurisdictional and substantive, were
also dismissed; the United States was awarded attorneys' fees and court
costs that will likely exceed $4 million. 15
The concerns raised by Methanex were thus ultimately unfounded.
NGOs and other NAFTA critics, however, continue to argue that were a
future tribunal reviewing similar facts to require compensation, it could
lead to a chilling effect on national and state government regulation in
these areas. 16 Some, including a majority of the Congress, as noted
below, have felt that an appellate mechanism to review investment
decisions could deal with the possible "rogue" arbitral decision, although
others have argued that this would not be a panacea for the many
perceived shortcomings of Chapter 11.17 Whether members of the

12.
Exec. Order No. D-5-99 of the State of Cal., (Mar. 25, 1999), as modified by
Exec. Order No. D-52-02 (Mar. 14, 2002), availableat http://www.governor.ca.gov.
13.
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Methanex Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim
to Arbitration, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Aug. 7, 2002), available at http://www.internationaleconomic-law.orgMethanex/Methanex%20-%20Notice%20of /20Intent.pdf.
14.
Methanex, Partial Award, supra note 10, 172(2).
15.
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, at 300 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Aug.
3, 2005), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes-us-6.htm. See Press Release,
U.S. State Dept., NAFTA Tribunal Dismisses Methanex Claim (Aug. 10, 2005), available
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/50964.htm (noting that Methanex is required to
pay the United States "more than $4 million in legal costs and arbitral expenses).
16.
See, e.g., U.S. Dodging Bullet in Methanex Ruling Does Not Remedy Threats
from NAFTA Chapter 11 Foreign Investment Protection Mechanism, PUBLIC CITIZEN,
Aug. 10, 2004, http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2017 ('Today's dismissal
of a NAFTA 'Chapter 11' challenge to California's phase-out of MTBE does little to ease
public concerns about the extraordinary foreign investor protection rules in NAFTA-style
agreements and does nothing to alleviate the unusual and radical threat to other local,
state and federal public interest policies.").
17.
See Letter from the Center for International Environmental Law to Robert
Zoellick, U.S. Trade Rep. (Dec. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ciel.org/Tae/
CAFTA_7DecO4.html (stating that "it is vital to emphasize at the outset that the
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business investment community will support the idea of an appellate
mechanism remains to be seen. Presumably, this will turn in large part
on the following factors: the scope of appellate review; the likelihood that
payment of an award will not be unduly delayed by appeal, as has
happened on some occasions with the ICSID Annulment Committee
Process (Annulment Committee)1 8 ; the belief by some claimants that
"betting the farm" high-stakes arbitrations of very complex matters
require a solid and predictable appellate process1 9 ; and whether support
for such a mechanism might head off efforts to substantively weaken the
Chapter 11 protections in subsequent BITs and FTAs. The objectives of
the proponents for an investment appellate mechanism, however, are
clearly broader than these concerns. Supporters of an investment
appellate mechanism desire greater consistency among the increasing
20
volume of ICSID, UNCITRAL, and other investment tribunal decisions
that are increasingly adopting conflicting interpretations of similar
treaty provisions on "fair and equitable treatment" or indirect
2 1
expropriation.
The most extreme example of such conflicting interpretations is
evident in the "Lauder" cases, which involved a dispute between a U.S.
investor and the Czech Government. One action was brought in London
by Ronald S. Lauder under the United States-Czech BIT, while the other
was brought in Stockholm by CME Czech Republic B.V. (a Dutch
company owned by Lauder) under the Netherlands-Czech BIT. The two
tribunals reached radically different results despite the similarity of the
two BITs; most significantly, the London tribunal declined to find an
expropriation, while the Stockholm tribunal, on the same facts,
determined that an expropriation had indeed taken place.2 2 On review
of the Stockholm decision, a Swedish court concluded that it lacked

introduction of an appellate mechanism fails to address the significant underlying
problems with both the substantive and procedural provisions in the investment chapter of
CAFTA.").

18.
See Anthony F.T. Fernando, The Requirement to Provide a Bank Guaranty,In
Return for a Continuation of the ProvisionalStay of Enforcement of the Award Under
Article 52(5) of the ICSID Convention-Can This be Justified?, at 4 (2004) (on file with
Author) (noting that in several ICSID arbitrations subject to multiple tribunal and
Annulment Committee review the entire arbitration process required seven and ten years).
19.
Knull & Rubins, supra note 1, at 564.
20.
The ICSID Secretariat reports that of the 159 cases submitted to ICSID from
the outset until mid-2004, 85 were before ICSID in one form or another during 2004, and
30 new cases were registered during the year. ICSID Annual Report 2004, at 3-4 (Sep. 10,
2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/pubs/1998ar/2004_icsid-ar_en.pdf.
21.
For a discussion of some of the jurisprudence in these areas, see David A.

Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions:From NAFTA to the United StatesChile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 679, 708-40 (2004).
22.
See Franck, supra note 1, at 1565, 1559-65 (discussing the Lauder cases in
detail); Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award (London Ct. of Arb. Sept. 3,
2001), available at http://www.cetv-net.com/iFiles/1439-lauder-cr-eng.pdf.
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jurisdiction to reconcile the two decisions, in part because the awards
involved different parties (Lauder in the London action and the Dutch
company in the Swedish case). 23 Numerous other conflicts, however,
24
exist among tribunals considering the same BIT language.
For many commentators, the question is not simply whether one is
for or against an appellate mechanism, but is a twofold inquiry: whether
one favors a particular mechanism and standard of review, and how one
would deal with the practical problems in making the concept a reality.
Even within a particular government, it seems reasonable to assume
that there may be different views among agencies: those principally
responsible for protection of foreign investment worldwide are perhaps
less enthusiastic about de novo review than the domestic agencies
responsible for implementing environmental policies or defending the
25
government against foreign investor claims.
Insofar as this Author has been able to determine, the appellate
mechanism concept-at least in the United States-appears formally for
the first time in the Trade Promotion Authority provisions of the Trade
Act of 2002:
[Tihe principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign investment are ... to secure for investors important rights
comparable to those that would be available under United States legal
principles and practice, by ... providing for an appellate body or similar
mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of trade
agreements .... "26

The Senate Report provides the rationale:
[Niegotiators should seek to establish a single appellate body to review
decisions in investor-state disputes. As the United States enters into more
investment agreements and the number of investor-state disputes grows,
the need for consistency of interpretation of common terms-such as

23.
See Franck, supranote 1, at 1567 (recounting the rationale of the Svea Court of
Appeal in declining to resolve the conflict between the two awards); Czech Republic v.
CME Czech Republic B.V., 42 I.L.M. 919 (Swed. Ct. App. 2003).
24.
See, e.g., SGS v. Islamic Rep. of Pak., Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No.
ARB/01/13 (ICSID 2003), 16 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 167 (2004), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGS-decision.pdf, [hereinafter Pakistan Award]
(holding that an "umbrella clause" in a BIT does not convert a contract breach into a treaty
breach). But see SGS v. Rep. of the Phil., Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No. ARB/02/6
(ICSID 2004) http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-final.pdf
[hereinafter
Philippines Award] (reaching the opposite conclusion). See also Franck, supranote 1, at
1569-1574.
25.
When the Author suggested in a telephone conversation with one of the U.S.
officials involved of the discussions of an appellate facility agreement within the U.S.
Government may have been more difficult than the upcoming negotiations with the other
CAFTA-DR parties, the official did not disagree. Telephone Interview with U.S. Official
(Aug. 23, 2005) (memorandum on file with Author) [hereinafter U.S. Official's
Observations].
26.
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2002)
[hereinafter TPA] (emphasis added).

46

VANDERBIL T]OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39-39

expropriation and fair and equitable treatment-will grow. Absent such
consistency, key terms may be given different meanings depending on
which arbitrators are appointed to interpret them. This will detract from
the predictability of rights conferred under investment agreements. A
single appellate mechanism to review the decisions of arbitral panels
under various investment agreements should help to address this issue
27
and minimize the risk of aberrant interpretations.

The "Trade Negotiating Objectives" set out in the President's Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA) provide in pertinent part that
[The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting
barriers to foreign investment ... and to secure for investors important
rights comparable to those that would be available under United States
legal principles and practice, by
(G) seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes between an
investor and a government through-

(iv) providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to
provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions
in trade agreements.. 28

Accordingly, the first two FTAs concluded under TPA, the U.S.Chile FTA and the U.S.-Singapore FTA, provide:
Within three years after the date of entry into force of the Agreement, the
Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or
similar mechanism to review awards rendered under Article 10.25 in
arbitrations commenced after they establish the appellate body or similar
29
mechanism.

Similar language is found in the U.S.-Morocco FTA and the 2004 U.S.Model BIT.3 0 If an agreement creating a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) is ever concluded, such appellate mechanism language
might also find its way into an FTAA investment chapter. This

27.
See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801 et seq.; S.
REP. No. 107-139, at 16 (2002) [hereinafter TPA Senate Report].
28.
19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv).
29.
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, Annex 10-H, June 6, 2003; Exchange of
Letters from Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade Rep., to George Yeo, Minister for Trade and
Industry (May 6, 2003) (on file with Author).
30.
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, Annex 10-D, June 15, 2004,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/BilateralMorocco -FTA/FInal -Text/Section-Index.
html; U.S. Model Investment Bilateral Treaty, Nov. 2004, Annex E, http://www.state.gov/e/
eb/rls/othr/38602.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2005). Note that the provision is entitled,
"Possibility of a Bilateral Appellate Mechanism," indicating a somewhat lukewarm
endorsement.

20061

APPELLATE REVIEW OFARBITRAL DECISIONS

possibility, however, is increasingly remote; that such an agreement
1
would cover investment is even more remote.3
CAFTA-DR offers a much more detailed instruction on developing an
appellate mechanism, possibly because of Congressional dissatisfaction
with the bare-bones formulation of the Singapore and Chile FTAs and
the lack of a short deadline for negotiations:
1. Within three months of entry into force of the Agreement, the [Fair
Trade] Commission shall establish a Negotiating Group to develop an
appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered by
tribunals under this Chapter. Such appellate body or similar mechanism
shall be designed to provide coherence to the interpretation of investment
provisions in the Agreement. The Commission shall direct the Negotiating
Group to take into account the following issues, among others:
(a) the nature and composition of an appellate body or similar mechanism;
(b) the applicable scope and standard of review;
(c) transparency of proceedings of an appellate body or similar mechanism;
(d) the effect of decisions by an appellate body or similar mechanism;
(e) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar mechanism to
the arbitral rules that may be selected under Articles 10.16 and 10.25; and
(f) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar mechanism to
existing domestic laws and international law on the enforcement of
arbitral awards.
2. The Commission shall direct the Negotiating Group to provide to the
Commission, within one year of establishment of the Negotiating Group, a
draft amendment to the Agreement that establishes an appellate body or
similar mechanism. Upon approval of the draft amendment by the Parties,
in accordance with Article 22.2 (Amendments), the Agreement shall be so
32
amended.

Once the CAFTA-DR enters into force, it will trigger after ninety
days a one-year negotiating process that may result in some sort of an
agreement contemplating the establishment of an appellate mechanism,
at least for the seven CAFTA-DR partners.3 3 The CAFTA-DR language,
however, leaves open key issues, including whether the appellate
mechanism will: (1) guard against aberrant interpretations of the treaty
or international law that jeopardize major public policy objectives, (2)
correct erroneous arbitral decisions on law and fact, or (3) serve both
purposes. Most significantly, despite the short deadline proffered for
initiating and completing the negotiations, there is no timetable for
submission of the agreement as an amendment to the parties' congresses

31.
See David A. Gantz, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Idea Whose Time
has Come and Gone?, 1 LOY. INT'L L. REV. 179 (2004); Kevin C. Kennedy, The FTAA
Negotiations:A Melodrama in Five Acts, 1 LOY. INT'L L. REV. 121 (2004) (both discussing
the problems that have led to a suspension of negotiations).
32.
CAFTA-DR, supra note 4, Annex 10-F.
33.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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for approval. Thus, it is entirely possible that parties could comply with
the CAFTA-DR language on negotiation of an appellate mechanism
agreement without taking any implementing action for months or even
years.
Presumably, the Senate Report and extended inter-agency
discussions have provided the necessary guidance to U.S negotiators in
this respect, but it is unclear whether the proponents in Congress and
elsewhere have given much thought as to how the concept would be
implemented. It is also difficult to see how negotiators from only seven
nations-parties to a single FTA-could themselves establish an
appellate mechanism with broader jurisdiction without the active
participation of other interested nations or the ICSID Secretariat. Even
so, an all CAFTA-DR appellate mechanism could be a significant first
step. The agreement could always provide for an ad hoc appellate
mechanism initially, to be used under other U.S. BITs and FTAs to the
extent such agreements are negotiated and, ultimately, for folding this'
mechanism into one at ICSID if and when one is established there.
It is also notable that all seven CAFTA-DR parties are also parties
to the ICSID Convention; their association with the Convention provides
a respected and widely used framework for investor-state disputes. 34 In
contrast, under NAFTA, use of the ICSID Convention provisions and
ICSID Arbitral Rules are impossible because neither Canada nor Mexico
is a party to ICSID. 35 The ICSID facilities are, however, available to
some non-parties under the ICSID Additional Facility Arbitral Rules
(Additional Facility), as long as either the government of the investor
claimant or the respondent government is a party to ICSID. 36 The
provisions of the ICSID Convention, including those that relate to the
37
Annulment Committee, do not apply to Additional Facility proceedings.
A non-ICSID appellate mechanism, however, may create a conflict with
the CAFTA-DR parties' obligations to use the Annulment Committee for
ICSID Arbitrations should the parties to a dispute elect to arbitrate
under the ICSID Convention's investment chapter.3 8 This problem could
be avoided if the scope of the appellate mechanism were limited to nonICSID Convention arbitrations, leaving ICSID arbitrations for review by
the Annulment Committee.

34.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
35.
See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories to the Convention,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2005).
36.
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Rule 2(a), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
facility/facility.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2005). This means the Additional Facility is not
available under CAFTA-DR, since all seven Parties are also Parties to the ICSID
Convention, despite the inclusion of the Additional Facility in the list of alternative
mechanism open to the parties to a dispute. CAFTA-DR, supra note 4, art. 10. 16(3)(b).
37.
Id. at art. 3.
38.
Id. art. 10:16:3(a).
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The appellate mechanism idea is not solely a U.S. and CAFTA-DR
concept, even if the inclusion of appellate mechanism negotiating
commitments in U.S. FTAs is likely driving discussions elsewhere. In
October 2004, the ICSID Secretariat issued its own proposal for an
appellate mechanism to be located at ICSID, presumably to stake out its
39
claim as a logical situs for a single investment appellate mechanism.
The ICSID "Discussion Paper" asked "whether an appellate mechanism
is desirable to ensure coherence and consistency in case law generated in
ICSID and other investor-to-state arbitrations initiated investment
treaties" 40 and concluded in the affirmative. The paper further asserted
that setting up different appeal mechanisms under each treaty
concerned would run counter to the objectives of coherence and
consistency.
Efficiency and economy, as well as coherence and
consistency, might best be served by ICSID offering a single appeal
41
mechanism as an alternative to multiple mechanisms.
While the ICSID paper, as noted earlier, no longer formally exists, it
was quite useful bureaucratically in making a forceful argument for
locating any investment appellate mechanism at ICSID. Many of the
ideas espoused will undoubtedly be revived, and at least be considered
by the CAFTA-DR negotiators, if the negotiations under CAFTA-DR
move forward as mandated.

II. REVIEW OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL DECISIONS: THE GENERAL
APPROACH

An initial question asks why a new or separate appellate
mechanism for investment disputes is needed when tribunal awards are
already subject to review by the ICSID Annulment Committee or by
national courts. As indicated below, a limited form of review is currently
a feature of investor-state arbitration.
A. Review of ICSID Arbitral Awards
An award by a tribunal operating under the ICSID Convention
Arbitration Rules is already to subject to limited review, to annulment
"on one or more of the following grounds":
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;

39.
40.

See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 3, Annex.
Id. at 4.

41.

Id. at 15.
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(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.

42

An ad hoc committee of three is appointed from a panel of
arbitrators with the authority to annul any part of the award; if the
award is annulled, either party to the arbitration may request that the
dispute be submitted to a new tribunal.
The ICSID Annulment Committee overturned some ICSID decisions
in favor of investors, particularly in the early years; the first three
awards reviewed by the Committee were set aside. 43 It has been
suggested that this was less a result of "appellate scope or systemic
weakness" than inexperience of the arbitrators and the committee with
ICSID rules. 44 Several recent annulment committee decisions have
found in the investor's favor. For example, in Wena Hotels, Ltd. v.
Egypt,45 the Committee rejected Egypt's claims that the ICSID tribunal
had failed to apply the applicable law or had departed from a
fundamental rule of procedure. In VivendiAnnulment, 46 the Committee
accepted the investor's claim and annulled the tribunal's refusal to
exercise jurisdiction even where its jurisdiction existed. The Committee
determined that by so refusing, the tribunal had manifestly exceeded its
powers under ICSID Convention's Article 52(1)(b). 47 One observer has
concluded that "if there were any doubt before, there is no doubt now
'48
that parties cannot routinely expect to be able to annul ICSID awards.
The ICSID Annulment Committee, however, has its shortcomings.
First, like the ICSID Convention itself, it is available only for disputes in
which both the investor and the home state are parties to the
Convention. 49 Secondly, the Annulment Committee is not a single body,
but a panel of arbitrators from which an ad hoc committee is chosen in
each instance. 50 Thus, the likelihood of consistency among decisions of
the Annulment Committee is at best moderate, since different
arbitrators are deciding different cases.

42.
ICSID Convention, supranote 34, art. 52 (emphasis added).
43.
See, e.g., Holidan v. Cameroon, Case No. ARB/81/2, 1 ICSID REV. FOR. INV. L.
J. 90 (ICSID 1986); Amoco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, Decision Setting Aside Award on the
Merits, 25 I.L.M. 1441 (ICSID 1986).
44.
Knull & Rubins, supra note 1, at 553.
45.
Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Rep. of Egypt, 41 I.L.M. 933 (ICSID 2002).
46.
Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg. Rep., 41 I.L.M. 1135 (ICSID
2002).
47.
ICSID Convention art. 52(1)(b) (2003) ("Either party may request annulment of
the award by an application in writing to the Secretary General on [, among other things,]
that the tribunal has manifestly exceeded powers.").
48.
Daniel Q. Posin, Recent Developments in ICSID Annulment Procedures, 13
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 170, 171 (2002).
49.
ICSID Convention, supra note 34, art. 25.
50.
Id. art. 52(3).
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B. Court Review of NAFTA Chapter 11 Awards
Of course, the ICSID Annulment Committee procedures are not
available for arbitral awards rendered under NAFTA, since as noted
earlier neither Mexico nor Canada is a party to the ICSID Convention.
Arbitration under NAFTA must proceed under either the UNCITRAL
Rules or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 51 While the use of the
ICSID Additional Facility has historically been largely limited to
NAFTA cases, arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is
52
common in investor-state arbitration under both NAFTA and BITs.
In either instance, a court proceeding may be brought to set aside or
annul the award in the state that is the situs, or place, of the
arbitration.5 3 For apparent reasons of expediency, Canada had been
54
designated as the situs of most arbitrations under NAFTA to date,
although arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11 can be held in any nation
that is a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.5 5 It is generally accepted that the
national courts, functioning in the place of arbitration, cannot be
deprived of jurisdiction over arbitral decisions rendered in their
territories (except to the extent that the parties to the ICSID Convention
have agreed otherwise, as for example, in their acceptance of the
Annulment Committee as the sole body for review).
Some states, however, do restrict the scope of court review of
arbitral decisions within their territories, in part because those involved
in international commercial arbitration tend to avoid siting arbitral
proceedings in states where the scope of review is broad. Many,
including several jurisdictions in Canada, have adopted the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration:

51.
NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1120.
52.
See Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Rep. of Ecuador, Final Award, Case
No. UN 3467 (London Ct. of Arb. 2004), available at http://www.asil.org/ilib/
OEPC-Ecuador.pdf (arbitration under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT administered by the London
Court of Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules); Lauder, supra note 22, and accompanying
text.
53.
See NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1136-3.
54.
For example, in Feldman v. United Mexican States, 42 I.L.M. 625 (ICSID
2002), where the claimant was a U.S. citizen and the respondent was Mexico, it seemed
logical to the tribunal (and, apparently, to the parties), to choose Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
as the place of arbitration, and that is what happened.
55.
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention], available
at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.recognition.and.enforcement.convention. new.york. 19
58/doc.html See NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1130-1.
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(1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an
application for setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of
this article.
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6
only if:
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that:
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was
under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of this State; or
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of
the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or
was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration,or contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration,provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that
part of the award which contains decisions on matters not
submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,
unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Law
from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with this Law; or
(b) the court finds that:
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of this State; or
(ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State.

56

Thus, Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which closely
follows Article V of the New York Convention 57 sets forth a very limited
scope of review. Investors (and arbitral tribunals) are likely to seek
states that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law as the situs of
arbitration, where experience indicates that the courts will undertake
only a limited review, rather than a de novo review of either the facts or
the law as determined by the tribunal. Despite this attempt at
uniformity of approach, however, national court review is not likely to
provide a high level of consistency even in a particular country, because

56.
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 34
(1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/1985
Model- arbitration.html (emphasis added).
57.
New York Convention, supra note 55.
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inevitably different judges sit on different cases, and some have more
experience with arbitral award review than others.
Under NAFTA Chapter 11 to date, all three annulment actions have
been brought in Canadian provincial or federal courts in the province
designated as the situs of the arbitration. These courts have applied the
grounds set forth in Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Commercial Arbitration, as adopted in Canada.
First, in United Mexican States v. Metalclad,the British Columbia
Supreme Court (a court of first instance) concluded that the tribunal
acted beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. The court found
a transparency requirement in Chapter 11 as its basis for determining
that Mexico had violated NAFTA Articles 1105 and 1110 on fair and
equitable treatment and expropriation, respectively. 58 (The tribunal's
finding of indirect expropriation was upheld on other grounds.) The
decision does raise some confusion as to the proper scope of review under
Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Act as applied in Canada; the
principal arbitral holding was characterized as a "misstatement of the
applicable law. '59 In so finding, the court implicitly determined that it
had jurisdiction to review alleged errors of law.
Second, in S.D. Myers v. Mexico, a federal court sitting in Ottawa
upheld the arbitral tribunal. 60 Employing a very formalistic approach,
the court declined to review a jurisdictional challenge based on Canada's
allegation that there was no "investment" by S.D. Myers. Since Canada
raised a jurisdictional issue without labeling it as such in its Statement
of Defense, Canada effectively waived its right to submit the issue as a
"jurisdictional" challenge. More broadly, the court applied what it said
was a "correctness" standard of review for legal issues (such as the
meaning of the word "investor") and a "reasonableness" standard for
application of facts to legal issues: "Article 34 of the [UNCITRAL Model
Code as adopted in Canada] does not allow for judicial review if the
decision is based on an error of law or an erroneous finding of fact if the
'61
decision is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
If the court in Metalclad had applied this standard it presumably
would have affirmed the tribunal. Also, in S.D. Myers, presumed
concerns over court review led to determinations "in the alternative."
Subsequent to the issuance of the court's opinion, S.D. Myers and
Canada apparently both accepted the judgment.
Third, in United Mexican States v. Feldman, an Ontario court of
first instance dismissed a challenge, affording the tribunal a high degree
of deference: "In my view, a high level of deference should be accorded to

58.
59.
60.

United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R. 3d 359.
Id. T 70, 72.
Attorney General of Can. v. S.D. Myers, Inc., [20041 FC 38, 77.

61.

Id.

42.
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the Tribunal, especially in cases where the Appellant Mexico is in reality
challenging a finding of fact. The panel who has heard the evidence is
best able to determine issues or credibility, reliability and onus of
proof. ' 62 The Feldman court also indicated that the public policy
exception to enforcement should be invoked only when the award "must
fundamentally offend the most basic and explicit principles of justice and
fairness in Ontario, or evidence intolerable ignorance or corruption on
the part of the arbitral Tribunal. '6 3 The appellate court affirmed the
denial of the Mexican government's appeal. 64 Interestingly, despite the
continued participation of the Attorney General of Canada in support of
Mexico, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the province's highest court,
noted that "quite apart from principles of international comity, our
domestic law in Canada dictates a high degree of deference for decisions
of specialized tribunals generally and for awards of consensual
'65
arbitration tribunals in particular.

III.

THE RATIONALE FOR AN APPELLATE MECHANISM

As noted earlier, some members of the U.S. Senate and Congress,
government agencies, and NGOs have been concerned about the lack of
an appellate process under NAFTA Chapter 11; they fear that ad hoc
arbitrators cannot be controlled and that legal errors cannot be
effectively corrected for current or future cases. Such fears are
particularly acute where major public policy issues are being decidedfor example, whether regulatory action can be considered expropriatory
as in Methanex, or whether imposition of unfair trade remedies such as
anti-dumping and countervailing duties are subject to challenge under
NAFTA Chapter 11.66 Concerns over tribunal errors are not unknown
among foreign investors themselves, particularly in "bet the company"
arbitrations with foreign states.
Under NAFTA Article 1131:2, "[a]n interpretation of the [Fair
Trade] Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on
a Tribunal established under this Section." This power of interpretation
may offer some relief from such errors, but its utility is uncertain. For an

62.
United Mexican States v. Feldman Karpa, No. 03-CV-23500, 77, ICSID No.
(AF)/99/1 (Ontario Super. Ct. Dec.3, 2003), available at http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/
2003/2003onscl 1923.html.
63.
Id.
87.
64.
United Mexican States v. Feldman Karpa, No. C41169 (Ontario Ct. App. Jan.
12, 2005), availableat http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2005/january/c41169.htm.
65.
Id.
37.
66.
See Canfor Corp. v. United States, Notice of Intent to Submit A Claim to
Arbitration, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. May 23, 2002). This action alleges that the United States
violated various provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11, in assessing anti-dumping and
countervailing duties against softwood lumber imported from Canada.
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interpretation to be issued, the three NAFTA governments must agree
that an interpretation is appropriate regarding the affected issue and
agree on the text. Only one interpretation has been issued during the
first twelve years of NAFTA.6 7 Also, at least one tribunal 68 has
suggested that it was appropriate for the tribunal to determine whether
the interpretation really an ultra vires effort by the parties to amend
NAFTA. (The tribunal in Mondev 69disagreed.) While the NAFTA
parties who are not parties to a particular Chapter 11 arbitration are
free to "make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation
70
of this Agreement," the tribunal has no obligation to accept such views.
Moreover, despite the lack of formal precedential value of earlier
arbitral decisions-NAFTA Article 1136:1 states that "[a]n award made
by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the disputing
parties and in respect of the particular case"-prior decisions are being
regularly cited by parties to arbitrations, which effectively requires
tribunals to discuss, distinguish, or follow those earlier decisions.7 1 This
increases the risk for concerned governments, NGOs, or private investor
groups in leaving an allegedly erroneous decision unchallenged.
There is obviously some dissatisfaction with national court review
(particularly in recent Canadian NAFTA cases), either because courts (1)
have only limited experience with the issues, (2) make flawed
interpretations of complex treaty provisions or principles of international
law, or (3) give too much (or too little) deference to the tribunals. Judges
generally have limited expertise in issues such as enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards and sovereign immunity, except for the those serving in
the Southern District of New York, on the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, or on federal courts in Washington, D.C. Most judges
have less experience with these issues than one could reasonably expect
from an appellate mechanism of investment law experts. After the
Canadian experiences, some of the pending NAFTA arbitrations have
selected Washington, D.C. as the situs, but to date there have been no
reviews in D.C. courts of NAFTA arbitral decisions. With court
annulment procedures, the result may ultimately be a three step process
(as in Feldman): (1) an arbitral award under ICSID Additional Facility
or UNCITRAL Rules, (2) an appeal to a court of first instance, and (3) an
appeal of the court decision to an appellate court in the same

67.
See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Dispute Settlement-Notes of
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 2001, available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nacINAFTA-Interpr-en.asp?format=print.
68.
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Damages Award, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. May 31, 2002),
availableat http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeAwardOnDamages.pdf.
69.
Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 85 (ICSID 2002).
70.
NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1128.
71.

Id. at art. 1136
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jurisdiction. The cost and time burdens for the parties are potentially
significant.
For governments and major companies, there is probably less
concern with time and cost considerations for an extended arbitral
process (including an appeal) when the issues are of broad public
interest or involve "bet the company" issues. Few today few really
believe that international arbitration, particularly between private
investors and states, is any quicker or cheaper than U.S. federal court
litigation, for example, even though the discovery process is more
circumscribed in an international arbitration. Small investors (e.g.,
Marvin Feldman) or governments of developing countries, however, may
be discouraged from using the process by the existence of a more formal
appellate process and the greater prospect that it will be used on a
regular basis.
Consideration of the investment appellate mechanism concept has
and will continue to be influenced by the general success of the WTO's
Appellate Body 72 in resolving international trade disputes. During the
past eleven years, the WTO Appellate Body has generally proven itself
able to produce consistent decisions in a very timely fashion-ninety
days-and with a high level of expertise. A total of seventy-seven
appeals were filed between 1995 and the end of 2005, although none
were filed in 1995. 73 The number of appeals peaked in 2000 at thirteen,
74
and has fluctuated between five and ten annually in the ensuing years.
Over the period 1995-2005, 68% of all panel reports were appealed to
the Appellate Body. 75 (The total number of consultations under the
Dispute Settlement Understanding 76 reached 332 by mid-August
2005.77) Many, including some high-ranking U.S. government officials
and members of Congress-some of whom are currently supporting an
investment appellate mechanism-have been critical of some of the WTO
Appellate Body decisions, but few have attacked the concept in general.

72.
The Appellate Body is created by Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU or Dispute Settlement
Understanding, and Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. World Trade Organization, Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes,art. 2, http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28dsu..e.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter DSU]; Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2 (2002), http://www.wto.org/englishdocs-e/legal-e/
legal-e.htm [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
73.
World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, Annual Report, Annex 2 (2005)
[hereinafter Appellate Body 2005 Report].
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at Annex II.
76.
See DSU, supra note 72, art. 4 (establishing that trade dispute resolution
under the DSU begins with consultations between the affected WTO Members).
77.
World Trade Organization, Disputes Settlement: The Dispute- Chronological
List of Disputed Cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu..e/dispustatuse.htm
(last visited Aug. 11, 2005).
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The experience of the WTO is not fully transferable to the
investment appellate mechanism concept. In particular, the WTO's
Appellate Body is applying a limited number of international trade
agreements while an ICSID Appellate Body could ultimately be applying
the differing provisions of hundreds of BITs and FTAs. There are
obvious useful parallels, however.

IV.

STRUCTURING AN APPELLATE MECHANISM: THE LEGAL AND
PRACTICAL HURDLES

The legal and practical challenges to the concept are enormous. In
addition to choice of the appropriate standard of review, many other
questions arise: the power of the appellate mechanism to confirm, set
aside, and remand; issues relating to choice of law; the relationship of
the appellate mechanism process to national court review; transparency
considerations; the appropriateness of bonding requirements for appeals
membership; and the complexities of structuring one or more appellate
bodies to deal with multiple agreements. Needless to say, it could be
very difficult to reach agreement on these issues among investor groups,
civil society, and governments, and within the U.S. government.
A. Standardof Review: Level of Deference to Tribunals
Perhaps the single most important issue facing negotiators of an
appellate mechanism, upon which governments and private investors
are likely to differ, is the standard of review. The possible range of
standards runs the gamut from the high degree of deference and narrow
standards of review incorporated in the ICSID and UNCITRAL Model
Law standards to de novo review at the opposite end of the spectrum. As
noted above, the ICSID Annulment Committee normally vacates an
arbitral decision only when "the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its
powers." Under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, a court is to
annul the tribunal's award when "the award deals with a dispute not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration." The court is also instructed to annul on other
grounds, such as when the award is contrary to public policy.
In Canadian practice, where the UNCITRAL Model Law standards
have been adopted, annulment on other grounds has been interpreted as
correctness on law, reasonableness on applying the law to facts under
S.D. Myers, and a "high degree of deference" under Feldman,although
the application of the standard has not been fully consistent, as noted
above.
Where the arbitral situs is outside the United States, the
international provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (the same
grounds that apply to enforcement under the New York Convention)
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would apply for review by U.S. courts. 78 Where the situs of the
international arbitration is in the United States-Washington, D.C., for
example, as in several pending NAFTA cases-both the domestic and
international sections of the Federal Arbitration Act would be applicable,
including the criterion of "manifest disregard of law. 80 While no U.S.
court decisions reviewing NAFTA arbitrations exist to date, it is
reasonable to expect that U.S. court review will afford a high degree of
deference to NAFTA and similar investment arbitrations; such deference
similarly occurs with review of other types of arbitral awards and in
enforcement actions under the New York Convention.
Presumably, the NGOs and at least some government supporters of
the appellate mechanism concept, have in mind a broader scope of
review. For example, Canada, the respondent in S.D. Myers, argued
unsuccessfully that the appropriate standard of review is "correctness"
not only with regard to the law but to the application of facts to the law,
a broader standard than that applied to review of arbitrations involving
only private parties. 81 One possibility is the WTO Appellate Body
standard for review of panel decisions, which empowers the Appellate
Body to review "issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel. '82 In practice, the WTO
Appellate Body has essentially followed this approach. The panels are
given relatively little leeway with regard to issues of law, but
83
considerable discretion with regard to their factual determinations.
The Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council standard calls
for deference to the expert tribunal below, contemplating affirmation
even where the reviewing court might have reached a different
conclusion, but requiring reversal where the tribunal below makes legal
errors. 84 The Chevron standard could logically be adapted in principle

78.
See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
79.
See Knull & Rubins, supra note 1, at 544.
80.
Id.
81.
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408, 33
(2001), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (follow "The Disputes" hyperlink; then
follow "Canada" hyperlink; then follow "S.D. Myers" hyperlink).
82.
DSU, supranote 72, art. 17, 6.
83.
Thus, in Appellate Body Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting the Importationof
Apples,
222, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003), the Appellate Body rejected certain
challenges to the Panel's fact-finding, indicating that it would not "base a finding of
inconsistency under [DSU] Article 11 simply on the conclusion that we might have reached
a different factual finding from the one the panel reached." Id. at 222 (quoting Appellate
Body Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContainingProducts,WT/D5135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001)). The Appellate Body also suggested
that certain other panel conclusions were within the panel's "margin of discretion" in
evaluating the relevant evidence. Id. at 221. For a comprehensive analysis of WTO
standard of review practice, See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, Standardof
Review in WTO Law, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 491 (2004).

84.
(1984).

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
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for an appellate mechanism for investment disputes, given the obvious
specialized expertise of most investor-state arbitration tribunals.
Effectively, that standard has been adopted for panel review of
administering agency decisions under the WTO's Antidumping
85
Agreement.
One interesting approach to the standard of review approach is
found in the ICSID Secretariat's Discussion Paper, which proposes the
following:
An award could be challenged pursuant to the Appeals Facility Rules for a
clear error of law or on any of the five grounds for annulment of an award
set out in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. 8 6 A further ground for
challenging an award might consist in serious errors of fact; this ground
would be narrowly defined to preserve appropriate deference to the
87
findings of fact of the arbitral tribunal.

The inclusion of "errors of law" is consistent with the earlier discussion,
and is likely to be found in any appellate mechanism proposal that
reaches fruition. It is doubtful, however, that there could be review of
"serious errors of fact" without the review process leading to an effective
de novo review by the appellate mechanism. There is obviously a
significant risk that this could become a Pandora's Box for both parties
to the proceedings at the tribunal level: either party could submit a
voluminous factual record reintroducing existing facts or introducing
new facts to buttress its case that the tribunal had made "serious"
errors. Surely any factual error important enough to change the result
of the case would necessarily be considered "serious" by the party
allegedly adversely affected.
Accordingly, inclusion of the broad power of the appellate
mechanism to review factual determinations made by the original
arbitral tribunal is likely to be strenuously opposed by the investment
bar. It might well be supported by Canada and Mexico, among other
state respondents, however, as a means of further reducing the risk of an
adverse tribunal ruling directing the government to pay money to a
foreign investor.

85.

[Iun its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and
whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the
establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased
and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different
conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned.

Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, art. 17.6, The Legal Texts-Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1999).
86.
See discussion supra Part II(A).
87.
ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 3, Annex, at 4.
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It is reported that the U.S. government, in preparation for the
CAFTA-DR negotiating group, has internally agreed on a middle
ground.88 Review of legal issues would not be de novo or subject to the
more limited Chevron standard, but would be guided by an intermediate
"clear legal error" standard. 89 Review of alleged factual errors would be
narrow, limited to situations where the complaining party could
demonstrate that "no reasonable trier of facts" could have reached the
conclusion found by the tribunal. 90 If this approach could be negotiated
with the other CAFTA-DR parties, it would represent a reasonable
compromise among divergent interests both in the United States and in
the other party nations.
B. Proceduraland JurisdictionalIssues
There is no reversal authority under NAFTA Chapter 19 on unfair
trade disputes; the agreement only confers the authority to affirm or
remand. 91 The ICSID Annulment Committee may affirm or annul, but
not effectively remand; at the request of either party, the dispute is to be
submitted to a new tribunal, presumably to start over. 92 The WTO
Appellate Body has no remand authority to panels, but only to "uphold,
'93
modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.
(Among the reforms of the Dispute Settlement Understanding being
considered by the WTO as part of the Doha Development Round is
creating authority for the Appellate Body to remand cases to the panels
94
for further proceedings in appropriate circumstances. )
Under NAFTA, a claimant may not enforce an award until 120 days
have elapsed without a party seeking annulment under ICSID, or until
three months have elapsed without any disputing party having sought
revision or annulment under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 95 (CAFTA-DR contains similar
language. 96) The ICSID Annulment Committee is granted specific
authority to stay enforcement of the underlying award pending the
97
committee decision.
Is, as most assume, the investment appellate mechanism to be a
substitute for situs court review, or would it be an additional step? If

88.
U.S. Official's Observations, supra note 25.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1904(8).
92.
ICSID Convention, supranote 34, art. 52(6).
93
DSU, supra note 72, art. 17(13).
94.
See Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman,
AmbassadorPter Balds, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/DS/9 (June 6, 2003).
95.
NAFTA, supranote 7, art. 1136(3).
96.
CAFTA-DR, supranote 4, art. 10.26(6).
97.
ICSID Convention, supra note 34, art. 52(5).
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part of the problem with the current system is court review in the state
of the situs, shouldn't that step be eliminated and effectively replaced by
the appellate mechanism? One selling point of an appellate mechanism
to the investment community is the possible elimination of two situs
court appeals-to the court of first instance and then to the appellate
level-a costly process in both time and money. Some NGO groups
opposed to NAFTA Chapter 11, however, have expressed their "strong
opposition to any provisions in an appellate mechanism that would
eliminate domestic legal review of relevant arbitral decisions,"98 even
though such court review is very circumscribed today, as discussed in
Part II above.
C.

Transparencyof the Proceedings

NAFTA itself provides that the final award may be made public if
either the government or the private party wishes to do so-in the cases
involving Canada or the United States-or in accordance with the
applicable arbitration rules in cases involving Mexico. 99 Even the formal
notice initiating arbitration may not be public if neither party decides to
release it. Most of the NAFTA transparency rules were add-ons. In July
2001, the NAFTA parties stated that "nothing in NAFTA imposes a
general duty of confidentiality" and agreed that they would "make
available to the public in a timely manner all documents submitted to, or
issued by, a Chapter 11 tribunal" subject to certain exceptions for
confidential or privileged information.10 0 In October 2003, Canada and
the United States, but not Mexico, issued statement indicating that they
would consent-and request disputing investors and tribunals to
consent-to holding hearings that are open to the public, subject to
measures to protect confidential business information. 10 1 At the same
time, a statement was issued setting forth procedures for non-disputing
10 2
party (amicus curiae) participation in Chapter 11 proceedings.

98.
CIEUNGO Letter, supra note 17, at 1.
99.
NAFTA, supra 7, Annex 1137.4.
100.
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes on Interpretationof CertainChapter 11
Provisions, at A(2)(b) (July 30, 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca./tnanacfNAFTA-Interpr-en.asp.
101.
NAFTA Commission Joint Statement No. 152 (Oct.7, 2003), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca; Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter 11
Arbitrations (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/openhearing-en.asp. Transparency rules are written into the investment chapter of CAFTADR, supra note 4, art. 10.21.
102.
Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-DisputingPartyParticipation
(Oct. 7, 2003), availableat http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alenaNondisputing-en.pdf.
See also USTR Press Release, NAFTA Commission Announces New Transparency
Measures (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.govlDocument-Library/Press
_Releases/2003/October/NAFTA-Commission-Annouces-New-TransparencyMeasures.html.
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Subsequent agreements, such as CAFTA-DR and the 2004 U.S.
Model BIT, incorporate similar transparency and third-party
participation language directly in the text of the agreements. 10 3 They
also reflect transparency requirements in the TPA. l0 4 NGOs, in
commenting on the appellate mechanism concept, have urged, among
other things, that it incorporate provisions for amicus curiae briefs and
open hearings.10, 5
Even the ICSID Secretariat has proposed
modifications in the Arbitration Rules that would facilitate open
hearings and the receipt of amicus briefs when the tribunal so
determined after consultation with the parties. 10 6 It can thus be
reasonably assumed that any appellate mechanism agreement
negotiated by the CAFTA-DR parties will incorporate transparency
provisions similar to those applicable in CAFTA-DR to the conduct of
0 7
tribunal proceedings, perhaps simply by reference.'
D. Bonding Requirements
Should an appealing government be required to protect investors by
posting a bond equal to the amount of the arbitral tribunal's award
pending appeal? This is a common requirement in U.S. courts as a
precondition for appeal due to the lengthy delays that occur when review
l0 8
takes place. The bonding requirement was a key element in Loewen.
Because the claimant allegedly could not meet bonding requirements for
an appeal set at $625 million, Loewen settled the case for $175 million
"under conditions of extreme duress" and brought a Chapter 11 claim.1 0 9
There is no specific provision in ICSID for such a requirement that
would apply in most instances to an appealing government. At least four
of the ad hoc ICSID Annulment Committees, however, have continued
the stay against enforcement for the tribunal's award only on the
condition that the applicant for the stay (the respondent government)
provide a bank guaranty or bond for payment of the award. 110 Such a

103.
CAFTA-DR, supranote 4, art. 10.21; Model BIT, supra note 30, art. 29.
104.
The principal negotiating objectives include, "[E]nsuring the fullest measure of
transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism ....
".TPA, supra note 26,
§ 3802(b)(3)(H).
105.

HOWARD MANN, ET AL., COMMENTS ON ISCID DISCUSSION PAPER, "POSSIBLE

IMPROVEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID ARBITRATION 8-9 (2004), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2OO4/investment-icsid_response.pdf.
106.
ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at 10-11.
107.
U.S. Official's Observations, supra note 25.
108.
Loewen Group v. United States, Final Award, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 26,
2003) 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003) available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Loewen/
LoewenFinalAward.pdf.
109.
Id. 6; Loewen Group v. United States, Decision on Respondent's Request for
a Supplementary Decision, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Sept. 13, 2004), available at
http://naftaclaims.com/DisputesUSA/Loewen/Loewen DecisionRequestConsideration.pdf.
110.
Fernando, supranote 18, at 1.
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stay has been continued only once under circumstances where no bond or
other security was required. 11 ' The ICSID Discussion Paper proposes
that the appealing state be required to post a bank guaranty or bond in
the amount of the award. 112 (The bonding issue would not likely arise
where the investor is seeking review of the tribunal's award, since the
investor would not be appealing unless the investor's request for
compensation had been denied.) This feature of the proposal would
likely be strenuously opposed by the ICSID member governments
negotiating an appellate mechanism. It may well be a make-or-break
issue with the investment bar, however. 113 Thus, it makes eminent
sense for the United States to include the bonding requirements in its
114
negotiating proposal for CAFTA-DR.
E. Choice of Law
If the investment appellate mechanism is to review issues of law
decided by investment tribunals, it, like the tribunals, will have to decide
what law applies. One of the differences between the WTO Appellate
Body and any proposed tribunal for investment disputes is that the WTO
Appellate Body applies in all cases a defined body of international trade
law: the "covered agreements." 115 Reference to outside international law
sources, other than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for
116
interpretative purposes, has been rare.
The choice of law issues tend to be even more complex under BITs
and FTAs. Even NAFTA is less straightforward than might be imagined
from the text: Chapter 11 tribunals are directed to "decide the issues in
dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of
international law."' 17 Yet this has led to considerable litigation under
NAFTA over the concept of "international law." For example, Article
1105 states that "[e]ach Party shall accord to investment of investors of
another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."11 s The

111.
Id. at 6.
112.
ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 3, Annex, at 6.
113.
Informal interview with Anthony Parra, Secretariat, ICSID (June 3, 2005).
114.
U.S. Official's Observations, supra note 25.
115.
DSU, supra note 72, art. 1(1). These agreements consist of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and its more than twenty annexed
agreements dealing with trade in goods, trade in services, trade-related intellectual
property rights, and resolution of disputes. Id. at app. 1.
116.
In EC-Hormones,the Appellate Body considered whether the "precautionary
principle" used in part by the EC to justify its ban on imports of hormone-fed beef was a
principle of customary international law, deciding in the negative. Appellate Body Report,
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS 2648/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1998),
available at http://www.wto.org.
117.
NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1131(1).
118.
Id. at art. 1105(1).
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scope of the concept "fair and equitable treatment" under international
law has never been clear, and the water was muddied early on when the
Tribunal in Pope & Talbot initially determined that this quoted language
provided claimants with a right that existed in addition to rather than
limited by the phrase "treatment in accordance with international
9
law."n
The concerns of the NAFTA parties over this Pope & Talbot
deviation prompted the first and, to date, only binding "Interpretation"
of NAFTA Chapter 11.120 The interpretation stated, among other things,
stated that "[t]he concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full
protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or
beyond that which is required by the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.' 121
In subsequent
agreements such as the FTA with Chile, the governing law is explicitly
"customary international law"122 ; customary international law is
explicitly defined as resulting from "a general and consistent practice of
States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation,"'123 presumably to
discourage tribunals from relying too extensively on other agreements
and arbitral decisions as a source of customary international law. The
2004 Model BIT and the CAFTA-DR both contain essentially identical
124
language.
Even in U.S. FTAs, however, this is not the end of the matter. In
the U.S.-Chile FTA, for example, the governing law for general claims is
"this Agreement and applicable rules of international law," as in
NAFTA; however, when a claim is submitted based on a specific
investment agreement or investment authorization, the tribunal is
directed to decide the manner
in accordance with the rules of law specified in the pertinent investment
agreement or investment authorization .... If the rules of law have not
been specified or otherwise agreed, the tribunal shall apply the law of the
respondent (including its rules on the conflict of laws), the terms of the
investment agreement or investment authorization, such rules of
25
international law as may be applicable, and this Agreement. 1

119.
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Merits, Phase II, at 110 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Apr. 10,
2001), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinalMerits
Award.pdf.
120.
NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1131(2) provides that "[a]n interpretation by the
[Free Trade] Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal
established under this Section."
121.
See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, (July 31, 2001),
availableat http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/Nafta-Interpr-en.asp.
122.
U.S.-Chile FTA, supranote 29, art. 10.4(1).
123.
Id. at Annex 10-A.
124.
Model BIT, supra note 30, art. 5, Annex A; CAFTA.DR, supranote 4, art. 10.5,
Annex 10-B.
125
U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 29, art. 10.21(1)-(2).
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A similar bifurcation-and challenge to the tribunal and any reviewing
126
body-appears in the CAFTA-DR.
Such differences obviously would not raise major problems if there
was a separate appellate mechanism for each FTA and BIT, as is
contemplated with CAFTA-DR. If a single appellate mechanism, at
ICSID or elsewhere, however, is ultimately created with jurisdiction over
dozens or hundreds of BITs and FTA investment provisions, or even
covering only the nearly fifty U.S. FTAs and BITs, 127 the level of
complexity will be high.
F. Structure and Membership of an Appellate Mechanism
Should an investment appellate mechanism be structured with
permanent members, like the WTO Appellate Body, or as an ad hoc
tribunal formed in each instance from a standing roster, like the ICSID
Annulment Committee? The WTO Appellate Body calls for a standing
roster of seven members, three of which serve on each case in
rotation. 128 In "a practice of collegiality," however, all seven members
review briefs, attend hearings, and participate to some extent in the
decision-making process; this approach adds to the consistency of
decisions.1 29 In the WTO's Appellate Body, there have been six to twelve
cases a year, and the members are effectively kept busy by the WTO at
least half-time. In contrast, the ICSID Annulment Committee actions
130
are rare: less than fifteen in forty years.
The caseload of an investment appellate mechanism will ultimately
depend not only on how many investor-state disputes are filed, but on
how many of the more than 2,000 BITs and dozens of FTAs with
investment provisions replace the ICSID Annulment Committee and
situs court review with exclusive jurisdiction for the appellate
mechanism, if and when such a mechanism is created under ICSID
auspices. A potentially large volume exists, but the number of cases in
actual practice is very difficult to predict.

126.
CAFTA-DR, supra note 4, arts. 10.22(1), 10.22(2).
127.
Once those already approved by Congress (CAFTA-DR, Morocco) enter into
force, the United States will have FTA based investment protection with eleven nations
(Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Morocco). Free Trade Agreements,
http://www.state.gov/eleb/tpp/c10332.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2005). As of March 2005, the
United States had negotiated 47 BITs and 40 were in force. U.S. Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/22422.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2005).
Several others FTAs are in various stages of negotiation or ratification (Morocco, Bahrain,
Panama, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru).
128.
DSU, supra note 72, art. 17(1).
129.
Debra P. Steger & Peter Van den Bossche, WTO Dispute Settlement: Emerging
Practiceand Procedure,92 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 79, 79 (1998).
130.
See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/casesl
conclude.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2005).
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Of course, if there are separate appellate mechanisms for each
agreement or even group of agreements, the caseload for any individual
agreement could be very small. Under NAFTA, there have been about
forty investment cases filed in eleven years 31 ; roughly half were brought
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 132 and the rest were brought
under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 133 Had there been an
appellate mechanism with jurisdiction, there might have been more
referrals to the appellate mechanism (rather than to a reviewing court)
than there have been to date; all involved the relatively rare monetary
awards against NAFTA parties. 134 If an appellate mechanism existed
and had been authorized to exercise a broader standard of review than
Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, at least some of the investor
claimants whose claims against the NAFTA parties have been
rejected 135 might have brought appeals. Even then, however, it is
unlikely that more than an additional handful of cases would have been
appealed.

131.
Based on the best information available (the Todd Weiler website,
http://naftaclaims.com), approximately forty-one Chapter 11 actions had been filed as of
September 2005, including those which may be dormant.
NAFTA Claims,
http://naftaclaims.com. While this is believed to be a comprehensive list, the secrecy
surrounding the Chapter 11 filing process does not assure that disputes and the
documents filed during the proceedings will be made public. Id. NAFTA has no such
requirements. An "Interpretation" issued by the parties on July 31, 2001, however,
requires all documents relating to Chapter 11 provisions, excepting those containing
confidential information, to be made "available to the public in a timely manner."
Compliance by the governments, claimants, or both appears to be very good.
132.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), available at http://www.uncitral.orgl
uncitrallen/uncitraltexts/arbitration1976Arbitrationrules.html.
133.
ICSID
Additional
Facility
Rules
(Jan.
2003),
available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm.

134.

Only four cases, Metalclad, S.D. Myers, Pope & Talbot, and Feldman have

resulted in monetary damages awards against Canada or Mexico, and there have been no
monetary damages awarded to date against the United States. Metalclad Corp. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB (AF)/97/i (Aug. 26, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36
(2001); Pope & Talbot v. Canada, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. May 31, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 36 (2001);
S.D. Myers v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408; Marvin Feldman v.
United Mexican States, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Dec. 16, 2002). All except Pope & Talbot were
appealed, unsuccessfully. An earlier case was settled after the Government of Canada
agreed to change certain regulations and piy costs. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, (NAFTA Arb.
Trib. June 24, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999).
135.
The rejected claims include: Methanex v. United States, Final Award, (NAFTA
Arb. Trib. Aug. 9, 2005); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, Final Award, (NAFTA Arb. Trib.
Apr. 30, 2004); Gami Invs. v. Mexico, Award, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Nov. 15, 2004); Loewen
Group v. United States, Decision on Request for Reconsideration, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Sept.
13, 2004) [hereinafter Loewen 11]; UPS v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, (NAFTA Arb.
Trib. Nov. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Feldman]; Loewen Group v. United States, Award,
(NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 26, 2003) [hereinafter Loewen 1]; ADF Group, Inc. v. United
States, Final Award, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Jan. 9, 2003); Mondev v. United States, Final
Award, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Oct. 11, 2002); and Azinian v. Mexico, Final Award, (NAFTA
Arb.
Trib. Nov.
1,
1999),
39
I.L.M.
537
(2000), all available at
http://www'naftaclaims.com/disputes.htm.
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Since the CAFTA-DR mechanism will likely cover that FTA alone,
at least initially, it would make little sense to create a standing body as
in the WTO. Rather, as the United States is likely to propose, 136 the
only cost-effective option would be a roster system similar to that used in
the ICSID Annulment Committee; in such a system, each CAFTA-DR
member government nominates a list of acceptable individuals, and
when an award is referred to the appellate mechanism, three members
are chosen from the rosters. Presumably, if normal practice is followed,
one member would be nominated by the claimant-investor, one by the
responding state, and the third chosen by the other two; failing
agreement, the third member would be chosen by an appointing
authority, presumably the ICSID Secretary General, as in CAFTA-DR
1 37
arbitrations.
Whether party nationals should be permitted to serve in an
investment appellate mechanism is a related issue. Party nationals
serve in investment tribunals under ICSID and NAFTA, but are
excluded from the ICSID Annulment Committee and WTO panels
(although not from the Appellate Body). Given the relative shortage of
highly experienced arbitrators, excluding arbitrators from the countries
whose nationals are the more frequent claimants, such as the United
States, could make the process difficult or impossible to administer.
Would fifteen or more outstanding investment arbitrators be willing
to accept nomination to serve on an appellate mechanism under CAFTADR? Probably, as long as listing on the roster did not foreclose their
continued work as arbitrators. The ICSID Secretariat had proposed a
panel of fifteen persons of "recognized authority, with demonstrated
expertise in law, international investment and investment treaties,"
each from a different nation, with three sitting on each appeal. 13 8 With
the CAFTA-DR appellate mechanism, it would make sense initially to
require each government to nominate at least two, and probably not
more than five, individuals who need not be nationals of the CAFTA-DR
nations. Having non-nationals on the roster would provide alternatives
for chairpersons who were perceived as independent from any of the
parties, and the U.S. negotiating proposal apparently contemplates such
139
nominations.
If there is a large roster, should some of the members be persons
with experience in environmental law or labor law in addition to-or
instead of-international investment law? There is no general bar to
such appointments for a roster-as distinct from a standing body-as

136.
U.S. Official's Observations, supranote 25.
137.
CAFTA-DR, supra note 4, art. 10.19(2).
138.
ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 3, Annex at 3. These criteria are similar
to those required under the WTO's DSU, supra note 72, art. 17(3).
139.
Telephone Interview with Member of the State Department's Advisory
Committee on Investment (Aug. 24, 2005) (memorandum on file with Author).
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the parties could presumably influence the selection or non-selection of
the roster members for individual disputes. The investment bar in the
United States would, however, almost certainly oppose the appointment
of roster members other than recognized international investment law
experts with prior arbitral experience.
Presumably, the costs of individual appeals would be borne by the
parties, as is now the case at ICSID for both tribunals and the
Annulment Committee. The ICSID rate is currently $300 per hour or
some higher agreed rate; certainly, the CDN $800 per day rate currently
paid to NAFTA Chapter 19 and 20 arbitrators 140 would not attract the
skilled arbitrators required to make a CAFTA-DR appellate mechanism
a success.
G. Conflicts of Interest
The problem of actual and potential conflicts of interest arises
wherever ad hoc arbitrators are used. Unless the appellate mechanism
effectively becomes a permanent tribunal, the members are all likely to
serve part-time. When they are not engaged in work for the appellate
mechanism they are likely to be involved in their area of expertise (i.e.,
investment disputes) either as arbitrators or counsel in investor-investor
or investor-state disputes. The potential for conflicts is thus significant.
The ICSID Convention and Arbitral Rules encompass no code of
conduct as such. Instead, Rule 6 provides a declaration by the
arbitrators disclaiming any reasons for non-service or lack of
independence. 141 Apparently because of some dissatisfaction with such a
bare-bones approach, the ICSID Secretariat has proposed a requirement
for a much broader disclosure requirement designed to identify possible
conflicts at the outset:
Attached is a statement of (a) my past and present professional, business
and other relationships (if any) with the parties and (b) any other
circumstance that might cause my reliability for independent judgment to
be questioned by a party. I acknowledge that by signing this declaration I
assume a continuing obligation promptly to notify the Secretary-General
of the Centre of any such relationship or circumstance that subsequently
142
arises during this proceeding.

Because of the obvious sensitivity of the appellate mechanism
process, particularly in the earlier year, a stronger code of conduct would

140.
Email from U.S. Secretary, NAFTA Secretariat, to Author (Aug. 25, 2005) (on
file with Author).
141.
ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 6(2), availableat
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partF.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).

142.

Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations (ICSID Secretariat,

Working Paper
sug-changes.htm.

May

12,

2005),

available at

http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
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be appropriate, perhaps patterned after the NAFTA Code of Conduct 143
or the WTO DSU Rules. 144 For example, the NAFTA Code of Conduct
(which is not applicable in Chapter 11 investment disputes but only to
those arising under other chapters) requires, among other things, that
A candidateshall disclose any interest, relationshipor matter that is likely
to affect the candidate's independence or impartiality or that might
reasonably createan appearanceof impropriety or an apprehensionof bias

in the proceeding. To this end, a candidate shall make all reasonable
efforts to become aware of any such interests, relationships and matters.

Once appointed, a member shall continue to make all reasonable efforts to
become aware of any interests, relationships or matters referred to in
section A and shall disclose them. The obligation to disclose is a continuing
duty which requires a member to disclose any such interests, relationships
45
and matters that may arise during any stage of the proceeding. 1

The WTO requires self-disclosure by panelists or members of the
Appellate Body of "any information that could reasonably be expected to
be known to them at the time which, coming within the scope of the
Governing Principles of these rules, is likely to affect or give rise to
justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality."'146 The rules
include "an Illustrative List (Annex 2) of examples of the matters subject
to disclosure," as well as a continuing obligation to "also disclose any new
information .... ,,147
H. Situs and Secretariat
For efficiency and consistency reasons, a single multilaterallysupported appellate mechanism, as contemplated in the Senate Report,
would be preferable to separate bodies for various agreements, if the
volume is likely to be sufficient to justify such bureaucracy. ICSID is an
obvious situs for a broadly based appellate mechanism, assuming that
there is a significant number of ICSID Convention parties who are
interested in an alternative (or addition) to the Annulment Committee.
Among other things, there is a highly competent ICSID secretariat. Even
if that staff were to require augmentation for such new responsibilities,

143.
Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement Procedures Under Chapters 19 [unfair
trade disputes] and 20 [disputes among parties] of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, available at http://www.nafta-sec.alena.org[DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?
CategoryId=75 (last visited Aug. 9, 2005) [hereinafter NAFTA Code of Conduct].
144.
Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/5
(2005), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/ab-e.htm#20 (last visited
Sept. 8, 2005) [hereinafter WTO Code of Conduct].
145.
NAFTA Code of Conduct, supra note 143, at MA, II.C (emphasis added).
146.
WTO Code of Conduct, supra note 144, art. VI(2).
147.
Id. at art. VI(1)(a), VI(5). See also Id. at Annex 2.
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this would be much more cost-effective than starting from scratch.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be much support among ICSID
members for an investment appellate mechanism instead of, or more
likely in addition to, the Annulment Committee, as indicated by the
Secretariat's withdrawal of the proposal. 148 (The nations likely most
concerned, Canada and Mexico, are not members of ICSID.)
In some respects this may be just as well. Because amendment of
the ICSID Convention requires unanimous approval or ratification or
acceptance of the now more than 140 members, 149 it would be
impractical to incorporate the appellate mechanism as an amendment to
the Convention. Rather, as the ICSID Secretariat suggested, it would be
preferable to have the earlier proposed ICSID Appeals Facilities Rules
approved by ICSID's Administrative Council (as the Additional Facility
Rules were some years ago). 150 If the Appeals Facilities Rules were
drafted in a manner similar to the Additional Facility [Arbitral] Rules,
they would be largely procedural in nature. Consent to the use of the
Appellate Facilities Rules, agreement to forego the use of the Annulment
Committee, and the substantive law rules to be applied, would
presumably be determined by the underlying BITs or FTA investment
chapters, 15 1 as the availability of the Additional Facility Rules is
determined. 152 Another alternative might be to conclude a "plurilateral"
protocol to the ICSID Convention, rather than an amendment, which
provided that as among the parties to the protocol the Appellate
Facilities Rules would be substituted for the Annulment Committee.
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), a group of wealthy countries (in addition to South Korea,
Mexico, and a few in Eastern Europe), 15 3 is in some respects another
logical home for a broadly-based appellate mechanism. Presumably, an
agreement creating an appellate mechanism, entirely procedural in
nature, would be easier to negotiate than the failed multilateral
agreement on investment. 154 As such it could be made available to nonOECD members, although some might be reluctant to participate in an
instrument prepared largely by capital-exporting nations. Furthermore,

148.
U.S. Official's Observations, supra note 25.
149.
ICSID Convention, supra note 34, art. 66.
150.
ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 3, Annex at 1.
151.
Id.
152.
See, e.g., Model BIT, supra note 30, art.24(3) (providing the usual three
alternative fora, ICSID Arbitral Rules, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or UNCITRAL
Arbitral Rules, as well as any other forum agreed to by the parties to the dispute); CAFTADR, supra note 4, art. 10.16(3) (same).
153.
See About OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/O,2337,en_2649_201185
1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2005) (explaining the objectives of the OECD, its
work and members).
154.
Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1995-1998), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1894819 1-1-1_1,00.html.
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the failure of the OECD's efforts to conclude the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment in 1998 may make the OECD locus unattractive to others.
Because there are hundreds of BITs in force similar to the OECD model
between developed and developing nations, this nexus might provide a
rationale for non-OECD member accession.
One commentator has suggested that the WTO's Appellate Body
might be given jurisdiction over investment disputes as well as trade
disputes. 155 While attractive from an efficiency point of view, this option
has a number of disadvantages, including the fact that WTO Appellate
Body members are chosen for trade law rather than investment law
expertise (although a number of present and former members have
investment law experience). Most WTO members have opposed a
comprehensive WTO investment agreement as one of the "Singapore
Issues" in the Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations 156 and
would likely strenuously oppose giving the WTO Appellate Body
jurisdiction over investment disputes, viewing it as an undesirable first
step in expanding the WTO's current very limited coverage of
investment issues.i5 7 This reluctance seems likely even if the agreement
creating an investment appellate mechanism were a "plurilateral"
agreement, with accession optional for the WTO Members.
There are, of course, ad hoc alternatives, and these undoubtedly
represent the most practical arrangement for an appellate mechanism
that may have, as the U.S. government apparently intends, very few
cases before it from year to year. 158 One could, for example, envision an

155.
Brian Schwartz, Professor, Manitoba Law School, suggestion made at
conference on NAFTA chap. 11, American University (March 2004).
156.
The relationship between trade and investment was among the topics included
in the Ministerial Declaration (Nov. 14, 2001) initiating the Doha Development Round of
WTO negotiations, although the decision as to whether to include negotiations on
investment issues was explicitly left for later. World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of November 14, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
Disagreement over the inclusion of the so-called Singapore Issues (competition law,
investment, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation) in the
negotiations was partially responsible for the collapse of the negotiations at the Cancun
Ministerial in September 2003. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declarationof
September 14, 2003, WT/MIN(03)/20. The Doha Work Programme adopted August 1, 2004,
contains an explicit understanding that competition, investment, and government
procurement issues "will not form part of the Work Programme ...and therefore no work
towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the WTO during the
Doha Round." Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on August
1, 2004, 1(g), WT/L1579.
157.
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round,
33 I.L.M.
1125
(1994),
available at
http://www.wto.org/English/docs-e/legal-e/18-trims.pdf (applying the GATT principles of
national treatment, transparency, and restrictions on quantitative restraints to
investment, and prohibiting most performance requirements).
158.
U.S. Official's Observations, supra note 25.
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appellate mechanism created by the seven CAFTA-DR parties and then
opened up to other parties to U.S. FTAs containing investment
provisions, or parties to BITs with similar provisions now being
negotiated by the United States. If, for example, the NAFTA parties
were to decide to amend NAFTA Chapter 11 to include an appellate
mechanism in lieu of court review in Additional Facility and UNCITRAL
cases-a political Pandora's Box of considerable dimension-they could
graft on to the CAFTA-DR appellate mechanism. Assuming that within
a few years the United States has treaty relationships contemplating
binding investor-state arbitration with at least fifty nations, 159 such a
limited appellate mechanism might be reasonable in terms of efficiency,
although probably less efficient cost-effective and politically acceptable
than an ICSID body.
One of the problems of an ad hoc appellate mechanism is the need
for secretariat services. Arrangements, however, could likely be made
with the ICSID Secretariat to conduct the CAFTA-DR appeals on a caseby-case basis, as has been done with a number of NAFTA Chapter 11
cases brought under the UNCITRAL rules. 160 This would effectively
limit any operational costs to the actual appeals filed. This is an
important feature of the appellate mechanism, given the likely great
reluctance among the CAFTA-DR member governments-including the
United States-to fund an entity that may have no cases for a number of
years.
Other convenient options are few. There are of course many
commercial arbitration sites, such as the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris 16 1 and the London Court of Arbitration. 162 Neither,
however, is well-suited to disputes involving the United States and
Central American or the Dominican Republic governments, compared to
the use of the ICSID facilities in Washington, D.C. At least in theory,
the CAFTA-DR parties could call upon the facilities of the Canadian or
Mexican sections of the NAFTA Secretariat. Those secretariats,

159.
See supra note 127.
160.
See International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States,
Procedural Order no. 1 (Jun. 27, 2003), para. 4, available at http://naftaclaims.com
Disputes/Mexico/ThunderbirdThunderbirdProceduralOrderl.pdf
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"Secretariat of ICSID shall render administrative services in relation to the arbitral
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Grand River Enterprises et al. v. United States of America (NAFTAJUNCITRAL
Arbitration), Minutes of the First Session of the Tribunal (Mar. 31, 2005), at 3-4, available
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http://naftaclaims.comDisputesUSA/GrandRiver/Grand%20River%20v.%20USAMinutes%20First%2OSession.pdf (indicating that ICSID is providing administrative
services to the tribunal).
161.
ICC, International Court of Arbitration, http://www.iccwbo.org/index-court.asp
(last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
162.
London Court of International Arbitration, http://www.lcia-arbitration.coml
(last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
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conceived to manage NAFTA Chapter 19 and 20 cases, 16 3 are generally
under-utilized, particularly in Canada where no Chapter 19 or Chapter
20 cases are even pending. 164 Canada, in particular, would provide a
reasonably well-staffed secretariat in a neutral country, probably at
165
costs below those charged by the ICSID Secretariat.
I. Modifications to Existing BITs and FTAs
Incorporating an appellate mechanism would require the
amendment of bilateral investment treaties, the investment provisions of
NAFTA, and other FTAs, as CAFTA-DR explicitly contemplates. 1 66 In
167
most instances, changes in domestic law would also be required.
Where an investment treaty contemplates the use of ICSID arbitral
rules, with exclusive resort to the ICSID Annulment Committee,
modifications in ICSID party obligations would likely be required to
substitute an appellate mechanism for the ICSID Annulment
Committee. The amendment of BITs would be politically easier than
amending investment provisions of NAFTA and FTAs, since it could be
difficult to limit the modifications to inclusion of an appellate
mechanism if NAFTA and FTAs are reopened. Given the need for
Senate advice and consent to protocols to existing BITs, however, the
process could take years to implement, unless the legislation creating
one or more appellate mechanisms could be included with other,
important but less controversial trade or trade-related legislation.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, the appellate mechanism concept seems to be more
generally favored by some states-including some officials in the United
States-than by private investors and their counsel. There are
indications, however, that with the right structure an appellate
mechanism would be preferred over substantial delays at ICSID or
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164.
NAFTA Secretariat, Status of Panel Proceedings, available at
http://www.nafta.sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?DetailID=9 (last visited Aug. 24,
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167.
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review by multiple national courts. 168 This is not surprising, given that
historically, most (but not all) of the requests for court or ICSID
Annulment Committee review are brought by respondent states, not by
investors. Also, there appears to be some concern among states that are
already reassessing the desirability of BITs that the existence of an
ICSID (or some other) appellate facility would effectively pressure states
concluding BITs to include the facility in new agreements.
In the Author's view, the investment appellate mechanism is a
proposal that could be beneficial to both governments and the
investment community, if it could be properly implemented. A wellstructured and staffed appellate mechanism could improve the
jurisprudence in investment-related arbitration by increasing
consistency and annulling the occasional wrong decision. A CAFTA-DR
mechanism, in particular, would provide some modest increase in
consistency over the current national court process. There, one can be
reasonably sure that one of several U.S. roster members would sit on
most or all of the cases, regardless of whether a U.S. investor was
seeking compensation from one of the other CAFTA-DR governments
(the most likely scenario) or vice-versa. As such, the appellate
mechanism could allay some of the fears of investment agreement critics
without detracting from the generally high level of investor protection in
NAFTA, the recent FTAs and BITs. This assumes of course-and this is
a major assumption-that those critics were supportive of the two or
three persons selected for the U.S. roster.
An investment appellate mechanism is not, however, a cure-all for
all or even most of the problems (real or apparent) that emerge in
investor-state arbitration. Even if, as hoped, the appellate mechanism
would substitute a single appellate step for what today may be multiple
levels of court proceedings when arbitral decisions are reviewed by
national courts, it probably would not significantly reduce expenses,
particularly if the appellate mechanism has the authority to review key
facts on a de novo basis. Nor it would satisfy those groups that are
broadly opposed to NAFTA Chapter 11 and similar mechanisms in BITs
and FTAs. 169 Further, it would not assure that governments unhappy
with decisions against them would receive relief.
Moreover, putting the idea into practice is fraught with practical
and legal problems. There is potential for enormous political controversy,
even if the scope of review is limited largely to legal issues in a manner
that gives considerable deference to the determinations of arbitral
tribunals. Those with significant interest in the creation and operation

168.
Telephone Interview with Member of the State Department's Advisory
Committee on Investment (Aug. 24, 2005) (memorandum on file with Author).
169.
See CIELINGO Letter, supra note 17 (setting out the objections to an appellate
mechanism that does not, among other things, permit national court review, apply local
law and assure that not only investment experts are appointed to the body).
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of an investment appellate mechanism-nations, foreign investors, and
NGOs, among others-will not likely see eye to eye on the major
structural and procedural issues. No mechanism satisfactory to the
foreign investment community is likely to be fully acceptable to
governments in their defendant roles, to environmental organizations, or
to other NGOs; this is particularly true with regard to standard of
review, posting of bonds, eliminating the role of national courts, and
choice of roster members.
CAFTA-DR is the likely laboratory for an initial effort to create an
appellate mechanism, once the agreement goes fully into effect. 170
Whether it is realistic for the CAFTA-DR nations to conclude
negotiations regarding such a novel concept within one year remains to
be seen. Nor can those in the U.S. Congress who supported the concept
of an appellate mechanism in the TPA legislation in 2002, but opposed
CAFTA-DR in 2005, be expected to support an amendment to CAFTADR to establish an appellate mechanism. It would also be unreasonable
to assume that the Bush administration, having won CAFTA-DR in the
House of Representatives only by putting the full prestige of the
presidency (and some "carrots") behind iti 71 would have any strong
interest in proposing a CAFTA-DR amendment to Congress for an
appellate mechanism or any other purpose. Thus, under the best of
circumstances-prompt agreement on an appellate mechanism by the
CAFTA-DR parties in the mandated negotiations-it could be some
years (if at all) before the CAFTA-DR is amended and even longer before
the first case reaches the appellate mechanism.
Notwithstanding these very substantial political challenges in the
United States and the complexities of legal drafting and negotiating,
CAFTA-DR does have several advantages as a guinea pig: there will be
seven nation parties (eventually), rather than only two, as in most other
FTAs, or three as in NAFTA. 172 All seven CAFTA-DR parties are
already parties to ICSID (unlike Canada and Mexico), 173 which will allow
flexibility in designating ICSID as the ad hoc secretariat or even
ultimately as the seat of a broader appellate facility. Having accepted
the existing investment provisions in CAFTA-DR, none of the other six
parties are likely to have significant opposition to an appellate
mechanism; it should have modest cost advantages-at least over a
multiple level situs court review process-and lead to greater
predictability than national courts. Since several CAFTA-DR parties,
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172.
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particularly Costa Rica and Nicaragua, have a history of expropriation
or other adverse actions against U.S. investors, 174 it is reasonable to
predict that an appellate mechanism applicable to investment disputes
under CAFTA-DR will eventually be utilized if it ever becomes
operational. There will be cases, although probably not many. A wellstructured investment appellate mechanism negotiated in the CAFTADR context should also serve as the model for broader applicability of the
concept. Is an appellate mechanism really worth all the effort, now and
in the future, to the governments, the investment communities, and civil
society?
The current system of the ICSID Annulment Committee for ICSID
arbitrations and national courts for all other cases would benefit from a
modest increase in the likelihood of consistency and the elimination of
multi-layer appeals in the national court systems. But is it really costeffective in the broadest sense to create an investment appellate
mechanism when the benefits over the existing system are so limited?
Certainly, in retrospect, there is serious doubt. The process, however,
has by now gained sufficient momentum to be likely to continue through
at least a good faith attempt at the drafting of a CAFTA-DR amendment.
For adoption and implementation, however, don't hold your breath!
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